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FREE SPEECH IN SCHOOLS
Bullying has probably existed for as long as children and schools
have existed. More recently however, in the United States we have
experienced a spate of bullying, as well as the subset known as cyber
bullying1—bullying via electronic means—that has led to tragic
consequences for the children involved. This has motivated lawmakers
and regulators to pay attention to the issue and attempt to address it.2
Forty-nine of the fifty states have some sort of bullying legislation on
the books, and many include provisions aimed at addressing cyber
bullying.3
1 Unless otherwise stated in this article, the term “bullying” is intended to include the
subcategory of “cyber bullying.”
2 See Raúl R. Calvoz, Bradley W. Davis & Mark A. Gooden, Cyber Bullying and Free
Speech: Striking an Age Appropriate Balance, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 357, 359 n.1 (2013) (listing
incidents of violence and suicide related to bullying).
3 ALA. CODE § 16-28B-4 (LexisNexis 2012); ALASKA STAT. § 14.33.200 (2013); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. § 15-341 (LexisNexis 2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-217 (2012) (declaring that
cyber bullying is punishable as a Class B misdemeanor); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48900(r) (Deering
2012); COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-32-109.1 (2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-222d (2012); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4112D (2013); D.C. CODE § 5-B2502.3 (LexisNexis 2012); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 1006.147 (LexisNexis 2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-751.4 (2012); HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 8-19-2, 8-19-6 (LexisNexis 2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-917A (2012) (declaring
bullying criminal); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/27-23.7 (LexisNexis 2012); IND. CODE ANN.
§§ 20-33-8-0.2, 20-33-8-13.5 (LexisNexis 2012); IOWA CODE ANN. § 280.28 (West 2013); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §72-8256 (West 2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 525.080 (LexisNexis 2012)
(proscribing harassing communications as a Class B misdemeanor); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§14:40.7 (2013) (criminally sanctioning cyberbullying but relegating offenders under age of
seventeen to Title VII of Children’s Code for disposition); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 20-A,
§ 1001(15)(H) (2012); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-424.3 (LexisNexis 2012); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 71, § 37O (LexisNexis 2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 380.1310b (LexisNexis 2012);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 121A.0695 (West 2013); MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-11-67 (2012); MO. ANN.
STAT. § 160.775 (West 2012); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 79-267, 79-2,137 (LexisNexis 2012);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 388.122, 388.123, 388.135 (LexisNexis 2012); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 193-F:3, 193-F:4 (LexisNexis 2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:37-15, 18A:37-15.1 (West
2012); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-2-21 (LexisNexis 2012); N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 11(7), 12 (Consol.
2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458.1 (2013) (declaring cyber bullying criminal); N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 15.1-19-17, 15.1-19-18 (2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3301.22, 3313.666 (LexisNexis
2012); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 24-100.4 (West 2012); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 339.351,
399.356 (West 2012); 24 PA. STAT. ANN. § 13-1303.1-A (West 2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS 16-21-34
(2012); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 59-63-120, 59-63-130 (2013); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 13-32-15, 1332-16, 13-32-18 (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 49-6-1015, 49-6-1016 (2013); TEX. EDUC. CODE
ANN. § 37.0832 (West 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53A-11a-102, 53A-11a-102-201 (LexisNexis
2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 11(a)(32) (2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-279.6 (2012); WASH.
REV. CODE. ANN. § 28A.300.285 (LexisNexis 2012); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18-2C-2, 18-2C-3
(LexisNexis 2012); WIS. STAT. § 118.46 (2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-4-312, 21-4-313
(2012); see also Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, CYBERBULLYING RESEARCH CTR. (Jan.
2013), State Cyber-Bullying Laws: A Brief Review of State Cyber-Bullying Laws and Policies,
available at http://www.cyberbullying.us/Bullying_and_Cyberbullying_Laws.pdf (cataloging
cyber bullying statutes by state). The only state currently lacking bullying legislation is the state
of Montana. Although no “bullying” law exists, the Montana Department of Justice makes it
clear that bullying and cyber bullying activity is prohibited under many existing laws. For Teens
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The federal government has also gotten involved. The United
States Department of Education, through the Office for Civil Rights
(“OCR”), deals with bullying and cyber bullying under Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.4
At the grassroots level, for school administrators, the issue is a
practical one: How does one protect students and the school
environment from bullying behavior? The issue becomes more
complicated when cyber bullying is involved as, by its nature, cyber
bullying involves the use of technology. This is not surprising as
technology is ubiquitous amongst teens, with over 78 percent
possessing mobile phones, 74 percent having mobile access to the
internet, and a full 93 percent of teens owning or having access to a
computer at home.5 When bullying involves technology—i.e. when it is
cyber bullying—the bullying “act” is often in the form of written words,
thus implicating students’ right to free speech. Moreover, because of the
nature of technology, actions taken by students using technology off
campus can make their way on campus, thus raising the additional issue
of whether school administrators have jurisdiction to regulate offcampus behavior.
In this article, we address the scope of student free speech rights as
it relates to cyber bullying. We provide a review of legal theories under
which school administrators can address cyber bullying while still
respecting student free speech rights and the First Amendment.
Additionally, we address the jurisdiction of administrators to deal with
off-campus bullying conduct.
THE BASICS
The fundamental standard in addressing student rights to free
speech was defined by the Supreme Court in Tinker v. Des Moines.6 In
Tinker, school officials learned that students planned to wear black
armbands protesting the Vietnam War.7 In response, the school
& Tweens: Cyberbullying, MONT. DEP’T OF JUST., https://doj.mt.gov/safeinyourspace/forteens-tweens-cyberbullying/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2013) (defining cyber bullying and citing
numerous Montana criminal provisions potentially implicated by wrongful conduct).
4 Russlynn Ali, Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, to Colleague (Oct. 26, 2010), available
at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201010.pdf. OCR also points out
that the Department of Justice retains jurisdiction over bullying acts that implicate Title IV of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 1.
5 MARY MADDEN, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, TEENS AND TECHNOLOGY 2013 4–5 (2013).
6 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971, 972 (S.D. Iowa 1966),
rev’d, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
7 Id.
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prohibited wearing of armbands on school grounds, a prohibition the
students violated and for which they were suspended.8 The Supreme
Court found that the conduct was speech, and that the school could not
regulate it without some justification. In addressing that justification,
the Court created what is now known as the “substantial disruption test”
or the Tinker test.
The Supreme Court held that school administrators may regulate
student speech if the regulation aims at preventing a foreseeable: (1)
material or substantial disruption in the school environment; or (2)
invasion of the rights of others.9 Thus, to begin with, administrators
may regulate student speech without violating the Constitution if they
foresee that the speech will disrupt school, or invade the rights of
others. Bullying or cyber bullying conduct which falls into either of
these categories may be prohibited and punished by administrators
without violating the First Amendment.
While Tinker is a starting point, the Supreme Court has been clear
that the “substantial relationship test” is not the only basis for regulating
free speech in schools. It is a starting point, but not the only tool
available to administrators. 10
OFF-CAMPUS SPEECH
Because cyber bullying often involves use of electronic media,
cyber bullying speech can originate off campus but intrude onto
campus. Can administrators deal with such off-campus speech? We
have found two lines of cases dealing with the issue.11 The majority of
cases apply the Tinker test regardless where the speech originated,12
8
9

Id.
See Calvoz, Davis & Gooden, supra note 2 (citing Saxe ex rel. Saxe v. State Coll. Area.
Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 217 (3d Cir. 2001), stating that a school may regulate speech under
Tinker if it reasonably believes “that speech will cause actual, material disruption”).
10 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 404-05 (2007).
11 J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills provides an exhaustive analysis of court decisions
addressing this issue. J.C. ex rel. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094,
1102-08 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
12 See Shanley v. Northeast Indep. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 970-71 (5th Cir. 1972) (applying
Tinker to a student-published underground newspaper which made its way onto campus); Killion
v. Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 455 (W.D. Pa. 2001) (applying Tinker to a
derogatory top-ten list distributed off-campus and via email which was brought to campus by one
recipient); Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2000)
(finding Tinker applied to a website created off-campus containing mock obituaries of students);
Beussink ex rel. Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1180 (E.D. Mo.
1998) (applying Tinker where an off-campus website containing criticism of school officials was
accessed by a student at school); O.Z. v. Bd. of Trs., No. CV 08-5671 ODW, 2008 WL 4396895,
at *4 (C.D. Cal., Sept. 9, 2008) (applying Tinker to a student disciplined for video created offcampus and posted to the internet that depicted the murder of a teacher); Pangle ex rel. Pangle v.
Bend-Lapine Sch. Dist., 10 P.3d 275, 285-86 (Or. Ct. App. 2000) (applying Tinker to a student-
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holding that as long as the speech foreseeably causes actual or potential
disruption on campus, Tinker is satisfied.13 The second, minority line of
cases look to establish a “nexus” between off-campus speech and oncampus effect before applying Tinker.14 Yet, even these cases hold that
Tinker applies if off-campus speech can, with reasonably foreseeability,
intrude on campus.15 Thus, under both lines of cases, if there is
reasonable potential for a disruption on campus, Tinker applies
regardless of the fact that speech originated off campus.
THE FRASER FUNDAMENTAL VALUES STANDARD
The Supreme Court has used other approaches to deal with student
free speech issues besides the Tinker test. In Fraser,16 which was the
next student free speech case decided by the Court after Tinker, the
Court did not apply the Tinker test.17 Fraser involved an allegedly
offensive speech18 given by a student in school for which he was
suspended.19 The student sued claiming violation of his First
Amendment right to free speech.20 Instead of applying Tinker, the
Supreme Court emphasized:
Surely it is a highly appropriate function of public school education
to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse.
Indeed, the “fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a

written underground newspaper disseminated on campus).
13 See cases cited supra note 12.
14 Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50 (2d Cir. 2008); Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d
34, 38-40 (2d Cir. 2007); J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 865 (Pa.
2002).
15 Doninger, 527 F.3d at 50; Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39-40; see also Laura Pavlik Raatjes,
School Discipline of Cyber-Bullies: A Proposed Threshold That Respects Constitutional Rights,
45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 85, 92-93 (2011) (stating that most courts will apply Tinker if it is likely
that disruption will occur on campus).
16 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 675 (1986).
17 James A. O'Shaughnessy, Is Cyber-Bullying the Next “Columbine”: Can New Hampshire
Schools Prevent Cyber-Bullying and Avoid Liability?, 52 N.H.B.J. 42, 44 (2011) (citing Doninger
v. Niehoff, 594 F. Supp. 2d 211, 223 (D. Conn 2009), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 642 F.3d 334 (2d
Cir. 2011), noting that the Court did not apply the Tinker standard in Fraser).
18 Justice Brennan’s Concurrence sets out the speech in full:
I know a man who is firm—he’s firm in his pants, he’s firm in his shirt, his character is
firm—but most . . . of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm. Jeff
Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he’ll take an
issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn’t attack things in spurts—he drives hard,
pushing and pushing until finally—he succeeds. Jeff is a man who will go to the very
end—even the climax, for each and every one of you. So vote for Jeff for A. S. B.
vice-president—he’ll never come between you and the best our high school can be.
Id. at 687.
19 Id. at 678.
20 Id. at 679.
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democratic political system” disfavor the use of terms of debate
highly offensive or highly threatening to others . . . . The inculcation
of these values is truly the “work of the schools.” The determination
of what manner of speech in the classroom or in school assembly is
inappropriate properly rests with the school board.21

In other words, the Court allowed regulation of this type of speech
as a part of the school’s obligation to teach fundamental values that
“disfavor the use of highly offensive or highly threatening” language.22
This concept has been applied by the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals as follows:
In a public forum, the Christian can tell the Jew he is going to hell, or
the Jew can tell the Christian he is not one of God’s chosen, no
matter how that may hurt. But it makes no sense to say that the
overly zealous Christian or Jewish child in an elementary school can
say the same thing to his classmate, no matter the impact. Racist and
other hateful views can be expressed in a public forum. But an
elementary school under its custodial responsibilities may restrict
such speech that could crush a child’s sense of self-worth.23

Courts have applied Fraser to prohibit other kinds of speech
which, while constitutionally protected outside of schools, were found
to be properly prohibited in the school setting. One court held that
display of confederate flags on campus could be regulated.24 Another
held that prohibition of Marilyn Manson t-shirts in school was legal.25
These forms of speech clearly could not be prohibited constitutionally
off campus. But, the Fraser standard, or “fundamental values standard,”
is a more flexible analysis that seeks to balance the right of the student
to “advocate unpopular and controversial views against the school's
interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate
behavior.”26 One court has in fact applied this standard in a cyber

21
22
23
24

Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986).
Id.
Muller ex rel. Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1540 (7th Cir. 1996).
Denno, 218 F.3d at 1275–76 (using Fraser precedent to bar display of confederate flag in
school even absent potential disruption); West ex rel. T.W. v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist. No. 260,
23 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1233-34 (D. Kan. 1998) (applying Fraser to hold that drawing and display
of confederate flag be prohibited and such conduct disciplined), aff'd, 206 F.3d 1358 (10th Cir.
2000).
25 Boroff v. Van Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465, 469 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that
under Fraser, a high school could prohibit wearing of offensive though not obscene Marilyn
Manson t-shirt).
26 Denno, 218 F.3d at 1273–74; see Christine Metteer Lorillard, When Children’s Rights
“Collide”: Free Speech vs. The Right to be Let Alone in the Context of Off-Campus “CyberBullying,” 81 Miss. L.J. 189, 192 (2011) (arguing that the doctrine established in Fraser provides
the best precedent for resolving cyber bullying cases); J.S., 807 A.2d at 868 (finding that if the
court solely applied Fraser, there would be “little difficulty in upholding the School District's
discipline”).
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bullying situation to hold that a student website, built off campus,
containing profane and threatening language directed at a teacher could
be prohibited and punished under Fraser.27
FIGHTING WORDS
The First Amendment only applies to “protected” speech.”28 Types
of speech not entitled to First Amendment protection include: child
pornography,29 obscenity,30 inciting imminent lawless action (the
example often given is of shouting “fire” in a theater),31 defamation, and
fighting words.32 The “fighting words doctrine” can in certain situations
apply to cyber bullying. Fighting words are defined as follows:
The test is what [a person] of common intelligence would understand
would be words likely to cause an average addressee to fight . . . .
The English language has a number of words and expressions which
by general consent are ‘fighting words’ when said without a
disarming smile . . . . Derisive and annoying words can be taken as
coming within the purview of the statute as heretofore interpreted
only when they have this characteristic of plainly tending to excite
the addressee to a breach of the peace.33

The test looks to both the content of the words as well as their context,
and evaluates the addressee’s reaction to the words based on a
reasonable person standard—how would a reasonable person respond.34
This doctrine has been applied in bullying cases, holding that
bullying words between children were unprotected fighting words. In
Svedberg v. Stamness,35 a fourteen year-old child and his friends teased
the plaintiff, calling him “Dumbo,” building snowmen with big ears in
the neighborhood, and at one point told Svedberg: “You had better
watch it Dumbo or I will kill you.”36 The Supreme Court of North
Dakota reviewed claims that a restraining order issued against the
fourteen year-old violated his right to free speech. The court applied the

27
28

J.S., 807 A.2d at 868–69.
Nevada Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2347 (2011) (determining that the
voting of a legislator is not speech); see, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957)
(holding that obscenity is not speech).
29 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765 (1982).
30
See Roth, 354 U.S. at 476.
31 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51-53 (1919).
32 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942); Beauharnais v. Illinois,
343 U.S. 250, 253 (1952).
33 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573.
34 Id.
35 Svedberg v. Stamness, 525 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1994).
36 Id. at 679–80.
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fighting words doctrine,37 stating that, in considering how a reasonable
person would respond, it was appropriate to consider the age of the
children.38 As the court stated:
No one would argue that a different reaction is likely if a thirteenyear-old boy and a seventy-five-year-old man are confronted with
identical fighting words. Accordingly, we hold that to determine
what constitutes fighting words, a court must consider both the
content and the context of the expression, including the age of the
participants.39

Taken in this context, the court held that the verbal attacks were fighting
words and were not protected speech.40
While Svedberg did not involve internet communications, the
court’s analysis is equally applicable to cyberbullying cases. If words
are such that they would cause an average addressee to fight, they are
not protected speech. Given the court’s consideration of the age of the
parties above, it is reasonable to expect that what constitutes fighting
words differs in terms of the age of the children involved—fighting
words for second graders may be different from high school children.41
CONCLUSION
Bullying is not a new phenomenon. But, like other aspects of our
lives, its reach and potential effects can be enhanced by technology.
This raises new issues for school administrators. It is easier to bully
when there is distance and perhaps anonymity associated with bullying
via technology, which may increase bullying activity. Compounding the
problem, the reach and potential impact of cyber bullying is greater as
the audience is larger, and the words published can have greater
permanence than simple utterances. Confronting cyberbullying in the
courtroom therefore requires adapting old doctrine to new technological
realities.
37
38
39
40
41

Id. at 683.
Id. at 684.
Id.
Id.
Svedberg, 525 N.W.2d at 684 (citing obvious difference in reactions between a seventyfive year old man and a teenager); compare Papish v. University of Mo. Bd. of Curators, 410 U.S.
667, 671 n.6 (1973) (per curiam) (holding that expelling a graduate student for distributing
newspaper containing “indecent” political speech was unconstitutional), with Hazelwood Sch.
Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (holding that a high school could censor newspaper
articles by students without infringing constitution); see also Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian
Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 523 F.3d 668, 674 (7th Cir. 2008) (drawing a distinction between adult
debates on social issues versus debates among children); cf. City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S.
451, 462 (1987) (holding that a trained police officer must exercise a higher degree of restraint
than the average citizen in the face of fighting words).
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Thankfully, the Constitution is nothing if not flexible. As we have
shown above, there is clearly room for administrators to deal with offcampus activity that comes on campus. The Constitution and caselaw
provide several distinct approaches for addressing cyber bullying
behavior. And, while the Supreme Court has yet to address cyber
bullying, its most recent ruling on student speech is instructive. In that
case, Morse v. Frederick,42 the Court emphasized two key points from
its prior student free speech precedent: (1) The “rights of students in
public school are not coextensive with the rights of adults in other
settings;” and (2) “Tinker is not the only basis for restricting student
free speech.”43
Under Tinker, school administrators have authority to deal with
cyber bullying incidences that foreseeably cause disruption on
campus—regardless of whether that activity originates off campus or on
campus. But, beyond Tinker, cyber bullying that constitutes fighting
words arguably falls entirely outside the scope of the First Amendment
as it is not protected speech and may be prohibited. Finally, as the
foregoing section suggests, there is a strong argument to be made that
speech or conduct which impedes the inculcation of fundamental values
by schools may be constitutionally regulated as well.

42
43

Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
Id. at 404–05.

